I built MorfiVT around a narrow, local question: what can I order for lunch today in Venado Tuerto?

The product collects the day’s menus in one place and sends people directly to each business to order. It is intentionally small in scope. I wanted to learn whether reliable local supply and a daily use case could create something more valuable than another generic directory.

Roughly two weeks after the first businesses went live, the early signal is encouraging.

The first operating snapshot

As of July 24, MorfiVT had:

  • 27 business records in production
  • 26 active businesses
  • 24 active businesses publishing a menu that day
  • 12 businesses authorized to send menus through WhatsApp
  • 18 documented business conversations

These are supply and operating metrics, not proof of audience retention or revenue. But they matter because a daily discovery product is useless if the offer is empty, stale, or unreliable.

The first success was not traffic. It was building enough current supply for the product to be useful on an ordinary weekday.

What worked

Keeping the scope hyperlocal made the value proposition easy to explain. Businesses do not need another application, a new ordering workflow, or manual catalog maintenance. They keep receiving orders through their existing channels; MorfiVT makes today’s offer easier to discover.

Manual onboarding also turned out to be an advantage at this stage. Every conversation exposed operational details the software alone could not teach me: when menus become available, when orders close, whether WhatsApp or Instagram is the reliable source, and what information a customer actually needs before ordering.

The daily publishing loop forced me to solve reliability early. Menus sent in advance can be processed and ready at the start of the day. Menus arriving during the morning are added as they become available. That is less glamorous than shipping another feature, but it is much closer to the real job.

What did not work

Early on, some public business information was added before I had recorded explicit permission. One business objected, and I disabled the profile.

That was an important correction. Public information being available is not the same as a business agreeing to participate. The onboarding flow now separates initial interest, profile configuration, and explicit confirmation before publication.

The mistake improved the operating system around the product: clearer consent states, a repeatable communication playbook, and a record of each interaction instead of relying on memory.

MorfiVT is becoming distribution for Encargame

Encargame helps businesses collect scattered orders into one workflow and turn them into a production list. The hard part is not only building that workflow. It is reaching businesses at the moment the pain is visible.

MorfiVT creates those relationships.

The emerging loop is:

  1. MorfiVT helps people discover what local businesses are selling.
  2. Working with those businesses reveals how they receive and prepare orders.
  3. Encargame offers a way to organize that demand.
  4. Better ordering infrastructure can eventually make the offer on MorfiVT easier to publish and measure.

I have one concrete cross-product signal so far. A MorfiVT Instagram story promoting Encargame—after communicating that more than ten businesses had registered interest—generated an inbound question from a business outside MorfiVT’s daily lunch section.

That is not a conversion, and I do not know whether the business ultimately registered. But it proves something smaller and useful: MorfiVT can surface Encargame to businesses beyond its original supply base.

The metrics that come next

For MorfiVT, I need to move from supply metrics to evidence of user value:

  • average daily active users,
  • weekly return rate,
  • clicks or contacts sent to businesses,
  • attributable orders, and
  • a first paying sponsor.

The current targets are 50 average daily active users, at least 25% weekly return, 200 monthly clicks or contacts to businesses, and one sponsor for a full month. These are targets, not results.

For Encargame, registration is not activation. A business is activated when it configures its offer, shares its link, and successfully manages a real order. The next validation targets are three to five recurring active businesses, 100 real orders, and one or two paying customers.

What success means at this stage

I am not calling two weeks of activity product-market fit. The useful result is that the system is producing better questions:

  • Can MorfiVT turn daily attention into measurable orders?
  • Can those relationships activate businesses in Encargame?
  • Can the combined loop retain both consumers and businesses?

The first two weeks gave me enough operating evidence to keep running the experiment. Now the job is to measure the loop, not decorate it.